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Abstract. Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient?  In this paper we 
construct a model that embodies common characteristics of resource contracts.  Using this 
model, we analyze a large class of real-world resource contracts and find them to be 
economically inefficient.  This inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency inherent in these 
contracts.  There are two possible ways to overcome this time inconsistency.  The first is to 
employ a sufficiently large penalty for early termination of the contract.  The second and 
possibly easier method is to offer an upward sloping conservation payment schedule so far 
overlooked by resource contracts.  Under this payment schedule, the agent’s ex-ante and ex-post 
contract choices coincide, social externalities are fully internalized, and the contractual outcome 
is economically efficient even in the absence of a penalty for early termination. 
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1. Introduction 
Resource conservation contracts are used across the world to partially or fully induce resource 
users to internalize externalities associated with resource utilization.  Consider a brief list of 
examples.
1  According to the OECD (1997), between 1993 and 1997, fourteen countries in 
Europe paid the equivalent of $11 billion to divert 20 million hectares of agricultural land into 
land reserve and forestry.  The U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) spends approximately 
$1.5 billion annually to contract 12-15 million hectares (Ferraro and Simpson 2002).  The Forest 
Conservation Easement Contract, which is a part of the Payment for Environmental Services 
Program (PESP) in Costa Rica, pays farmers $42 per acre per year for five years to grow forest 
products on their land (Malavasi and Kellenberg, 2002).  And finally, Conservation International 
(2000) is currently leasing a large area of forested land in Guyana to preserve biodiversity. 
Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient?  In this paper we 
construct a simple model embodying commonly observed characteristics of resource contracts.  
We then use this model to analyze the economic efficiency of what appears to be a large class of 
real-world resource contracts. 
Our model has the following four defining features.  1) The agent
2 is required to adopt a 
resource conserving technology.  For example, this could entail setting land aside, or reducing 
tillage on existing fields.  2) The contract is for a pre-specified period of time.  For example, the 
CRP requires farmers to put land aside for 10-15 years, and the lease on forested land in Guyana 
lasts 30 years.  3) Agents receive conservation payments while the conserving technology is 
                                                 
1 Many other resource contracts were discussed at a symposium titled “Direct Payments as an Alternative Approach 
to Conservation Investment”, held at the 16th Annual Meetings of the Society for Conservation Biology, 
Canterbury, England, July 2002 (http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/special/special.htm).  Also see Pagiola et. al. (2004) for 
other examples. 
2 For the rest of the paper we shall call the entity offering the contract a principal (this is usually either a 
governmental, or a non-governmental agency).  The entity accepting the contract is called the agent (this is usually 
either a private land, or resource owner, or can even be another government).     3
employed, and are not penalized for exploitative behavior once the contract expires.  This feature 
holds for programs such as the CRP, or PESP.  Consequently, the resource contract can prevent 
the exploitation of a resource only temporarily.  Once the contract expires, the agent has the 
incentive to revert to exploitative behavior in place before payments were made.  And finally, 4) 
the payment schedule associated with the contract can be one of two types.  Either the agent 
receives a constant payment per period for adopting a resource-conserving technology (we call 
this a technology contract).  Or the agent receives a payment depending on the amount of 
resource conserved (we call this a measured accumulation contract).
3 
We find that resource contracts sharing these features are economically inefficient.  The 
inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency
4 associated with a “payment-discount” inherent in 
these contracts.  As the principal cannot penalize actions outside the contract, he discounts 
conservation payments below actual benefits associated with conservation.
5  T h i s  payment-
discount accounts for the external costs of resource exploitation after the contract expires.   
Because the contract payment, and consequently, the payment discount are pre-determined 
before the contract is implemented, we find that the agent’s incentives before, and during the 
contract differ.  Before the contract is implemented, the agent prefers a contract with the efficient 
length of time.  However, once in a contract with the efficient length of time, she has the 
incentive to exit the contract early (as the payment discount can no longer be adjusted for early 
                                                 
3 The contracts listed in the first paragraph are examples of technology contracts.  Examples of measured 
accumulation contracts include the Sustainable Forest Management Contract (a declining payment contract within 
PESP), and various forms of debt-for-nature-swaps, which are managed by The Nature Conservancy (see their 
website for details).  Technology contracts and measured accumulation contracts are currently being developed to 
induce farmers to accumulate soil carbon in an attempt to offset greenhouse gas emissions (Feng et. al. 2002, Antle 
et. al. 2003). 
4 Kydland and Prescott (1977) introduced time inconsistency to economics. While, their original exposition involved 
monetary policy, time inconsistency naturally applies to several issues involving dynamic interactions. 
5 Please see Feng et al. (2002), and Chomitz and Lecocq (2003) for a discussion of how the price of sink-based 
carbon in a tradeable permit system should be discounted relative to the price of carbon associated with permanent 
greenhouse gas reductions.   4
abandonment) and make an even higher profit than the ex-ante efficient contract promises.  The 
principal recognizes this incentive, and if the agent cannot credibly commit to stay in the contract 
for the efficient length of time, the contract that emerges from their interactions is shorter than 
the efficient contract.  This inefficiency persists irrespective of whether a technology or 
measured accumulation contract is employed. 
We also analyze the relative efficiency of the technology and measured accumulation 
contract.  Contrary to results in recent literature (e.g., Antle et al. 2003, Ferarro and Kiss 2002, 
Ferraro and Simpson 2002), we find that a technology contract is more efficient than a measured 
accumulation contract.  Technology payments are often criticized because marginal payments do 
not coincide with marginal resource accumulation.  However, in the presence of time 
inconsistency, technology payments offset some of the agent’s incentive to abandon the contract 
early.  In a measured accumulation contract, payments decline along the length of the contract.  
This is because most renewable resources (such as soil carbon) accumulate at a decreasing rate 
as they approach their steady state.  In a technology contract, payments are equally distributed 
across the entire contract.  This difference implies that the marginal benefit of being in a 
technology contract declines slower than in a measured accumulation contract, and the agent 
stays in the contract for longer. 
As mentioned earlier, the time inconsistency derives from the agent’s inability to commit 
to the efficient contract.  A potential commitment device is a cost incurred by the agent for early 
abandonment of the contract (for example, a penalty imposed by the principal).  We investigate 
the effects of costly abandonment in the context of the two types of contracts discussed above.  
We find that the minimum cost of abandonment required to restore efficiency in the technology 
contract is smaller than the measured accumulation contract.  This is consistent with fact that   5
greater inefficiency is associated with a measured accumulation contract. 
Finally, we present a conservation payment scheme that overcomes time inconsistency 
even in the absence of costly abandonment.  The payments in this scheme are not related to 
technology adopted, or resource conserved.  Payments are equal to the social marginal benefit of 
an additional unit of time in the contract.  In direct contrast to technology, or measured 
accumulation contracts, these payments increase over time.  Further, on receiving these 
payments the agent’s ex-ante and ex-post contract term choices coincide.  
The intuition behind the increasing marginal payment scheme is simple.  In the case of a 
temporary resource contract where the required technology is imposed and exogenous, the 
agent’s real choice variable is time spent in the contract (or equivalently the time she abstains 
from exploitative behavior).  This implies that payments in the proposed scheme equal the social 
marginal benefit of the agent’s choice variable.  Consequently, these payments help the agent to 
internalize the payment-discount consequences of early abandonment, and overcome the 
problem of time inconsistency.  This is not possible if payments are linked to exogenous 
variables like technology, or the amount of resource accumulated.
6   
The main contribution of this paper is in recognizing a previously ignored commitment 
aspect of resource conservation contracts.  Most conservation contracts have discounted and pre-
determined payment schedules extending over several periods of time.  This implies that issues 
of commitment are central to their implementation.  On recognizing these issues, the time 
inconsistency inherent in commonly observed temporary resource conservation contracts 
becomes apparent.  Another contribution is that this paper presents an intuitive payment schedule 
                                                 
6 Note that the lesson learnt from this result is quite intuitive: in order to design efficient resource contracts the 
principal should link payments to the agent’s choice variable and not to other exogenous variables in the contract.   6
that overcomes this problem of time inconsistency even in the absence of penalties.
7 
The rest of the paper is structured as following.  In Section 2 we present the basic 
contracting model.  In Section 3 we discuss the optimal time in a first-best contract, and compare 
this with the time spent in a technology, or a measured accumulation contract.  We also discuss 
the role of cost of abandonment as a commitment device.  In Section 4 we present a modified 
conservation payment that overcomes time inconsistency, and we conclude in Section 5. 
2. Model 
The agent can choose one of two technologies.  Technology A is resource conserving (e.g., 
grassland, or forest land).  Technology B is relatively resource depleting (e.g., cultivated 
cropland).  In the absence of a payment for resource conservation, technology B is more 
profitable, and is chosen by the agent. 
The principal (i.e., contracting agency) offers the agent a one-time resource conservation 
contract.  If the agent accepts, she agrees to use technology A until date T.  During this phase the 
resource is accumulated.  Once the contract expires, the agent switches back to the more 
profitable technology B.  From this point onwards, the resource accumulated during the 
contracting phase is de-accumulated. 
Resource State Equations:  Assume that there exists a long-run steady state resource stock 
associated with either technological choice.  The steady state associated with resource 
conserving technology A is Ra, and the steady state stock associated with technology B is Rb 
( ab R R > ).  Without loss in generality, we normalize these stocks so that  1 ab RR −= .  As the 
default technology of choice for the agent is B, we assume that that at the start of the relevant 
                                                 
7 A potential practical issue is that the proposed non-linear, efficient payment schedule might be difficult to 
implement.  However, a linear payment schedule approximating the efficient schedule is also likely to significantly 
improve the efficiency of resource contracts.   7
time horizon (date 0 – when the contract is offered), the resource stock is at the steady state: Rb. 
Let R(t) denote resource in excess of Rb at date t.  If the agent adopts technology A, the 
stock of resource rises albeit at a declining rate.  This reflects the fact that growth slows as the 
resource approaches its steady state.  Once the agent reverts back to technology B, the resource 
stock in excess of Rb declines continuously toward zero at rate b.  Formally, these two 
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We assume that baρ >> (ρ  is the common discount rate).  The growth and decline of the 
resource is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Excess Resource Accumulation and De-Accumulation 
 
Technology Choice in the Absence of a Contract:  While using technology A, the agent earns a 
fixed amount  a π  at each instant of time.
8  This approximates situations such as land retirement 
programs.  While using technology B, the agent earns an instantaneous return of  ( ) b kR t π +  
                                                 
8 This is a simplifying assumption.  One might think of a more general specification where instantaneous returns 
during the contracting phase are related to the stock of the resource.  However, making this assumption does not 
alter the qualitative results presented here. 
0 
1
Time  T 
R(t) 
Technology A  Technology B   8
(where  k > 0 is a fixed parameter).  This captures the fact that the agent’s returns from 
exploitative behavior are typically related to the stock of the resource, for example, crop yields 
are relatively high when land is rich in organic matter.  We assume that  ba π π >  to ensure that 
profits from using technology B are higher than profits from technology A for all  () 0 Rt ≥ . 
Consider the agent’s decision regarding use of technology A in the absence of a contract.  
As indicated earlier, T denotes time the agent spent in technology A prior to permanently 
switching to technology B.  The agent’s objective is to choose T to maximize the present value of 
profits subject to the resource growth equation: 
  () ( )
0
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Integrating and using equation (1) to substitute for R(t) we get 
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. (4) 
Equation (4) can be rearranged to illustrate the instantaneous marginal benefit and cost from 
remaining in technology A at time T.   













Remaining in technology A marginally longer at date T provides the agent with instantaneous 
profit  a π , and raises the excess resource by 
aT ae
− .  This increases the discounted stream of   9






.  Note that the marginal benefit declines as 
T increases (i.e., as  , a TM B π →∞ → ).  This is because as the resource approaches its carrying 
capacity, its rate of increase declines. 
The instantaneous marginal cost of maintaining technology A for an extra unit of time is 
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In addition to foregoing constant profit  b π , the agent also forgoes the discounted stream of 
profits associated with exploiting the excess resource.  This discounted stream of profits 
increases over time as the resource stock increases. 
To ensure that technology A is never chosen in the absence of a contract (this ensures that 
(0) b R R = ), the marginal benefit and cost schedules must not intersect.  The formal condition to 
ensure that  0 T =  is optimal in the absence of a contract is 







<− . (7) 
This restriction is illustrated in Figure 2.  If the inequality in equation (7) does not hold, it 
becomes optimal for the agent to build up the resource by employing technology A, and earn 
relatively low short-run profits.  The agent later employs the relatively profitable technology B 
and reaps the benefits from exploiting the accumulated resource.   10
Figure 2: Technology A is not used in the absence of a Contract 
 
The Resource Conservation Contract:  Every unit of resource conserved has an instantaneous 
social value of p  (conversely, resource exploited has a social value of –p). The date 0 value of a 
unit of resource conserved at time t is therefore
t pe
ρ − . 
The agent receives continuous payments for the time in the contract.  Further, the 
principal cannot link these payments to any actions taken by the agent after the contractual 
period.  The contractual payment at date t is denoted w(t): 
  { } () ( , )  w i t h    0 ,
t wt T p e a
α θαα α
− =+ ∈ . (8) 
When  0 α = , the contract specifies a “technology payment” because the agent receives a 
constant payment over time for employing technology A.  When  a α = , the contract specifies a 
“measured accumulation payment” because the instantaneous payment is equal to the actual 
value of resource accumulated less a constant discount factor.  As we shall see below, this 
constant discount factor captures the social loss from resource de-accumulation on expiration of 
the contract. 
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MC   11
The principal correctly anticipates that once the contract expires, the agent switches from 
technology A to B and exploits the excess resource conserved.  Using equation (1), we can 
calculate the social value of the resource accumulated and de-accumulated.  Initially the agent 
starts at the steady state resource stock Rb.  In the contracting phase, the agent employs 
technology A until date T.  On exiting the contract the agent reverts back to technology B for all 
remaining time, and the resource returns to the steady state prevalent before the contract was 
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which can be reduced to, 
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. (10) 
Throughout this paper, we assume that the principal pays the agent the discounted social 
value of resource accumulated and de-accumulated.  Formally, this implies 
0 () ( )
T t wte d t T
ρ − =Φ ∫ .  
Using equations (8) and (10), and integrating, we obtain the relevant expression for the intercept 
term of the payment schedule –  () , T θ α : 
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. (11) 
If the agent agrees to a contract of length T, the principal pays according to equations (8) and 
(11), with either  0 α =  for a technology payment, or  a α =  for the measured accumulation 
payment.  Note that  ( , ) T θ α  is positive under a technology contract ( ( ,0) 0 T θ > ), and negative 
under a measured accumulation contract ( ( , ) 0 Ta θ < ).  Also note that  ( , ) 0 Ta θ <  is a measure   12
of the instantaneous average social loss from the resource exploited on expiration of the contract. 
3. The Optimal Time in a Contract 
We now examine the equilibrium length of the resource contract.  We present both the first best 
outcome and the actual outcome of the technology and measured accumulation contracts. 
The Efficient (First-Best) Outcome:  The efficient outcome is achieved when the agent fully 
internalizes the social value of her actions.  One way to induce internalization is to pay the agent 
the social value of resource accumulated with technology A, and charge for the social value of 
the resource de-accumulated with technology B.  This first-best (or complete) contract 
maximizes the sum of profits, and the social value of resource accumulation and de-
accumulation.  Further, as the principal pays the entire social value to the agent, this contract also 
maximizes the agent’s post-contract private returns. 
Under the first-best contract, the agent’s maximization problem is 
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where the superscript F denotes first-best. Let T
* denote the first best-length of the contract.  As 
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9 To ensure that T








>− −  is necessary.  This restriction is consistent with equation (7), 
which ensures that technology A is not chosen in the absence of a contract.   13
As we did earlier, we can also rearrange equation (13) to illustrate the marginal benefit 
and cost from maintaining technology A at time T.  Under the first-best contract, the marginal 
benefit of extending the contract is 
  []
1 Fa T





=++ −  + 
. (15) 
By maintaining technology A, the agent earns instantaneous profit,  a π , a contract 
payment
aT pae
− , and the capitalized value of increased profitability of technology B due to 
additional resource accumulated:  []
1 aT p kb pa e
b ρ
− 
+−  + 
.
10  The marginal benefit from 












A comparison of equations (5) and (16) reveals an expected result, the first-best contract shifts 
the agent’s marginal benefit schedule upward. 
Now consider the marginal cost of staying in the first-best contract: 
















In terms of marginal cost, equations (6) and (17) show that because the agent is penalized for 
resource exploited, profit earned by using technology B at date T is relatively lower under the 
first-best contract.  Assuming that kb p > , equation (17) also implies that the marginal 
opportunity cost of maintaining technology A increases as T increases.  The combination of an 
upward shift in marginal benefit and a downward shift in marginal cost induces the agent to 
                                                 
10  Note that this capitalized value is lower than that in equation (5).  This is because under the first-best contract, 
returns from technology B are lower than in the absence of a contract.   14
spend time under the contract.  We illustrate this in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Agent Choice in a First Best Contract 
 
Time Inconsistency:  In this section we evaluate the efficiency of the technology, and the 
measured accumulation contract relative to the first-best.  We assume that the agent is free to 
abandon the contract prior to the scheduled termination date at no cost.  Later in the paper, we 
show that the results of this section also hold if early abandonment is costly, as long as it is not 
excessively costly.  
The principal offers a contract which requires the agent to adopt technology A until date 
T, in exchange for a pre-specified payment.  Once the contract is signed, the agent takes the pre-
specified payments as given, and thus from the agent’s perspective, the payment schedule is: 
{ } () ( )  w i t h    0 ,
CC t wt p e a
α θα α α
− =+ ∈ .  The difference between this payment schedule and the 
original payment schedule given by equation (8) is that  ()
C θ α  is written as a fixed parameter 
rather than a function of T.  This is because once the contract is signed, time in the contract T 
cannot alter the payment discount anymore. 
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The agent takes this payment schedule as given, and then optimizes her time in the 
contract.  In a rational equilibrium, the principal recognizes the agent’s ex-post optimization.  As 
a consequence, the principal offers a contract for the optimal ex-post period of time for the agent. 
This implies that the value of  ( )
C θ α  is given by equation (11) with the agent’s ex-post optimal 
choice of T substituted in. 
The agent’s objective function under the contract is  
  () ()
0
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Using equations (1) and (8) to substitute for R(t) and w(t) (with  ( , ) ( )
C T θ αθ α = ) we get 
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(20) 
Unlike the first-best case, a closed form for the optimal time in the contract does not exist.  
Nevertheless, by expressing equation (20) in terms of the marginal benefit and cost of staying in 
the contract we can illustrate the effects of time inconsistency on the contractual outcome. 
Consider first the measured accumulation contract (where  a α = ).  The marginal benefit 
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. (21)   16
Given the earlier assumption that a ρ > , the third term of the MB schedule is negative for all 
0 T > .
11  On comparing equations (15) and (21), this implies that for all positive and finite T, the 
marginal benefit of being in the measured accumulation contract is lower than the marginal 
benefit of being in the first-best contract.  Correspondingly the marginal cost of staying in either 
the measured accumulation, or technology contract is the same as that under no contract (given 
by equation (6)).  This is because the agent cannot be charged for actions taken once the contract 
expires.  As discussed earlier while comparing equations (6) and (17), this implies that the 
marginal cost of staying in either contract is higher than under the first-best contract. 
Now consider the technology contract (where  0 α = ).  The marginal benefit of staying in 
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(22) 
As explained earlier, the last bracketed term of the MB schedule is negative for all  0 T > .  





− >  ++ 
.  In other words, like the measured 
accumulation contract, the marginal benefit of staying in the technology contract is lower than 
the marginal benefit of being in the first-best contract. 
Compared to the first-best contract, the downward shift in the marginal benefit schedule 
and the upward shift in the marginal cost schedule for both contracts implies that the equilibrium 
length of either resource contract is sub-optimally low.  We illustrate this in Figure 4. 
                                                 
11 This expression can be signed negative if  ( ) ( ) 11
Ta T a T T ee a ee
ρρ ρ
−− −− −> −. Given that a ρ >  this condition 
holds because both sides vanish when T = 0 and the left-hand side rises more quickly than the right-hand side as T is 
increased.   17
Figure 4: The Equilibrium Length of Contracts 
 
On comparing equations (15) with (21) and (22) we can see that all MB curves coincide 
as  T →∞, and that for any given positive and finite T, the following relation holds true: 
FT CM A MBM B M B >>.  Further, as negative payments in contracts are not possible, all MB 
curves also coincide when  0 T = .  We also know that for all positive T, 
FT CM A MCM C M C <=, 
and that the MC curves coincide when  0 T = .  This implies that 
* TC MA TT T >>.  This result is 
illustrated in Figure 4, and is also stated below. 
Proposition 1.  Assume that the agent can costlessly abandon the contract prior to the specified 
termination date.  The equilibrium length of time spent by the agent in either the technology or 
the measured accumulation contract is shorter than the ex-ante efficient length of time. 
Proof: Follows from Figure 4 and the corresponding discussion. ■ 
Ex-ante (i.e., before the payments are predetermined) the agent would prefer a contract 
for the efficient amount of time (T
*).  However, once in the contract, payments are pre-
determined, and T
* is no longer optimal.  Note that as T
* maximizes the agent’s profits, and V(T) 
a π
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is strictly concave, Proposition 1 also implies that agent welfare under either contract is sub-
optimal.  This inefficiency is the result of time inconsistency.  As the agent cannot credibly 
commit to stay in the contract for the ex-ante efficient length of time, the equilibrium amount of 
time spent in either contract is less than optimal. 
If the principal naively offers the agent payments based on the ex-ante efficient time, the 
agent has the incentive to quit early and earn even higher profits than the first-best contract 
promises.  This occurs as contract payments include a discount for resource exploited in the post-
contract phase and, this discount is a decreasing function of time in the contract T.  The agent 
realizes that once payments have been pre-determined, there is no mechanism to raise the price 
discount retroactively for time not spent in the contract.  This provides the agent an incentive to 
cheat on the ex-ante agreed terms by quitting early.  This gives the agent the benefit of a lower 
discount, and higher ex-post profits.  However, in equilibrium, the principal recognizes the 
agent’s incentives.  The principal thus offers payments based on the ex-post marginal benefit and 
cost of staying in the contract which results in an inefficient outcome. 
Now consider the relative performance of the technology and measured accumulation 
contract. 
Proposition 2.  Assume that the agent can costlessly abandon the contract prior to the specified 
termination date.  The equilibrium length of time the agent stays in the technology contract is 
longer than the length of time in the measured accumulation contract. 
Proof: Follows from Figure 4 and the corresponding discussion.■ 
Because the agent’s objective function is concave in T, an immediate implication of 
Proposition 2 is that the agent’s profits are lower with a measured accumulation contract than   19
with a technology payment contract.  In other words, the technology payment contract is more 
efficient than the measured accumulation contract. 
Unlike the measured accumulation contract, the technology contract pays an average 
benefit for resource accumulation and de-accumulation which does not decline over time.  It 
follows, therefore, that the payment with a technology contract is less than the social value of the 
resource accumulated in the early part of the contracting period and is greater than the social 
value in the latter part of the contracting period.  Given that the marginal opportunity cost is the 
same for both types of contracts, the averaging feature of the technology contract serves to 
extend the equilibrium length of the contract beyond the length of the measured accumulation 
contract.  Recall however that the technology contract suffers from the time inconsistency 
pointed out in Proposition 1.  Thus despite the additional contract length, the technology contract 
is still inefficiently short. 
An interesting aspect of the previous analysis is that if  0 b =  then all contractual 
inefficiency in the measured accumulation contract disappears.  With 0 b =  the marginal benefit 
and cost schedules are identical for the measured accumulation contract and the first-best 
contract.  This occurs because with  0 b = , the resource is not exploited once the agent exits the 
contract.  Consequently, the payment schedule is not discounted to account for the post contract 
resource exploitation.  Interestingly if b=0, the equilibrium outcome under the technology 
contract is inefficiently long.
 12  
Costly Abandonment and Credible Commitment:  Time inconsistency arises in the previous 
section as the agent is free to abandon a contract prior to the specified termination date.  Costless 
                                                 
12 From equation (22) one can see that if ba < , the length of time the agent stays in the technology contract 
exceeds the efficient outcome.   20
early abandonment implies that the agent cannot credibly commit to stay in the contract for the 
efficient length of time.  In this section we show that the time inconsistent outcomes implied by 
Propositions 1, and 2, can emerge even if early abandonment is costly, but not excessively 
costly.
13  We graphically illustrate the threshold cost of abandonment for either type of contract.  
If the actual cost is less than or equal to this threshold, the results stated in Propositions 1, and 2 
are valid.  If the cost is higher than these thresholds, the agent can credibly commit to stay in the 
contract for the ex-ante efficient length and efficiency is restored. 
Assume that the principal offers the agent payments based on the efficient time of exit 
(
* T ).
14  L e t   1
TC MB denote the marginal benefit of staying in this contract when technology 
payments are offered.  Further, let  1
TC T denote the optimal time to exit the contract when this 
marginal benefit function is offered and abandonment is costless.  Let  1
MA MB and  1
MA T  be the 
corresponding function and time associated with measured accumulation payments.  From 
equations (21) and (22) we know that  11
TC MA MBM B >  for all positive and finite T.   
Now let C denote the agent’s cost of abandoning the contract.  We define a threshold 
value 
TC C  associated with the technology contract.  If 
TC CC ≥ , the agent stays in the technology 
contract for the efficient time.  However, if 
TC CC <  the agent abandon’s early at  1
TC T .  
Similarly, 
MA C  is the threshold associated with the measured accumulation contract.  We 
illustrate these thresholds with the aid of Figure 5.   
                                                 
13 This cost of abandonment could be a sum of penalties, legal fees, and loss in reputation. 
14 In other words, the discount is calculated under the assumption that the agent will exit at the efficient time: 
()
*, T θ α    21
Figure 5: Costs of Abandonment or Penalties Necessary 
 
A measure of 
TC C  is given by the cross-hatched area A in Figure 5, and a measure for 
MA C  is given by summing areas A and B in Figure 5.  These cross-hatched areas signify the gain 
in profits for the agent who abandons early (before 
* T ) and benefits from the fact that the 
principal applied a payment discount lower than it should have been.  However, if the cost to exit 
early is higher than the profitability of abandonment, it is no longer optimal to abandon early.  A 
comparison of the size of cost of abandonment results in the following corollary. 
Corollary to Proposition 2.  For all positive and finite T
*, the minimum cost required to restore 
efficiency in the technology contract is smaller than that required under the measured 
accumulation contract.   
Proof: From Figure 5 we can see that 
TC MA CC < ■  
This corollary also implies that for all  ( ) ,
TC MA CCC ∈  the first best outcome T
* emerges 
with the technology contract, and an inefficient outcome (T1
MA) emerges with the measured 
accumulation contract.  In other words, this corollary is an alternative way of presenting 
b π  









TC T  
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Proposition 2.  It restates the earlier result, that given the time inconsistency problem inherent in 
these contracts, a technology contract is more efficient than a measured accumulation contract.  
4. An Efficient Non-Linear Contract Payment Schedule 
Irrespective of the cost of abandonment, there exists a non-linear payment schedule that always 
results in the first-best outcome.  Consider the following proposition. 
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. (23) 
With this schedule, the first best outcome is achieved even if the cost of abandoning the contract 
is zero.  
Proof: Substitute the expression for w
*(t) into equation (18).  The objective function is now 
identical to the objective function in equation (12) that gives rise to the first best outcome (T
*).■ 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is simple.  In the case of a resource contract where the 
required technology is imposed and exogenous, the agent’s real choice variable is time in the 
contract.  If we pay the agent the social marginal benefit of an additional unit of time in the 
contract, the efficient outcome results.   
Note that w

















. The instantaneous payment under this schedule increases over 
time.  This is in direct contrast to measured accumulation contract, where the payment declines 
over time, and to the technology contract, where the payment is constant over time.  With the 
efficient contract, future payments rise fast enough at the margin to allow the producer to fully   23
internalize the payment discount consequences of early abandonment.  This internalization is not 
possible if the payment is linked to exogenous variables such as technology, or the amount of 
resource accumulated.  In a sense, the proposed payment schedule contains an implicit dynamic 
Pigouvian tax to address the abandonment externality. 
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 (24) 
On comparing equations (15) and (24) we can see that the marginal benefit of staying in this 
contract is higher than the marginal benefit of staying in the efficient or complete contract.  As 
explained earlier, the marginal cost of staying in this contract is the same as that under no 
contract.  In other words, the marginal cost of staying in the efficient non-linear contract is 
higher than under the efficient contract.  The efficient non-linear payment schedule is illustrated 
in Figure 4.  The marginal benefit of staying in this contract is denoted MB
*, and it intersects the 
marginal cost of staying in the contract MC
* (which is the same as the marginal cost under the 
technology, or measured accumulation contract) at the optimal time T
*. 
4. Conclusions 
Through this paper we illustrate a time inconsistency inherent in most resource contracts.  We 
also discuss two potential ways to overcome time inconsistency.  The first is to create credible 
commitment through a cost of abandonment.  The second is to present the agent with an efficient 
upward sloping payment schedule that encourages her to internalize externalities associated with 
early abandonment. 
While a comparison of the relative efficiency of these two methods to overcome time 
inconsistency is out of the scope of the paper, an informal discussion at this point might be   24
useful.  Resource contracts can include an explicit penalty for abandonment. However, for 
political or other reasons these penalties may be problematic to implement and costly to enforce.  
More importantly, if the size of penalty is not as high as the threshold discussed earlier, the 
contract remains inefficient.  On the other hand, adjusting payments to reflect the efficient 
payment schedule is likely to be an easier and less costly means to overcome time inconsistency.  
The potential practical issue might be implementing the complicated non-linear upward sloping 
schedule required for efficiency.  However, a linear upward sloping payment schedule that 
approximates the efficient payment schedule is likely to be a significant improvement.  This will 
encourage the agent stay in the contract for a longer and more efficient length of time under 
constant or declining payments. 
The upward sloping efficient schedule highlights the fact that temporary resource 
contracts are inherently different from permanent resource contracts.  If the resource is 
permanently conserved, a payment scheme that links payments to the amount of resource 
conserved is efficient.  However, this is not true if the resource is conserved only for brief period 
of time.  In such a case, payments should be linked to the length of time the owner abstains from 
exploitation.  Linking the payments to the technology adopted, or the amount of resource 
conserved can lead to an inefficient amount of time allocated to resource conservation.  This 
clarification is increasingly important given that conservation contracts are being proposed as a 
means to preserve resources worldwide.   25
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